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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE INDIGENT'S
RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL-Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367

(1979).
Over the past forty-seven years, the sixth amendment' right to2
counsel, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
has undergone almost constant expansion. In 1932 the evolution began
in Powell v. Alabama,3 when the Supreme Court held that, in capital
cases: (a) the sixth amendment right to counsel is of a fundamental
nature, and applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment; and (b) the state must provide counsel for
indigent defendants. Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady,4 the Court
refused to extend the right to counsel further, holding that indigents
were not entitled to appointed counsel in most noncapital state cases.
But the Court soon recognized that under some circumstances counsel
must be appointed even in noncapital cases.'
Although Betts nominally remained the general rule, the majority
of the cases that followed were found to fall under a "special circumstances" exception. 6 Finally, in 1963, the Court specifically overruled Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright,7 holding that fundamental
fairness required that counsel be appointed in all felony cases. The Gideon holding was further broadened in Argersinger v. Hamlin,8 when
the Supreme Court unanimously extended the right to have counsel appointed in all cases which result in the actual deprivation of liberty.
Subsequent state and lower federal court decisions differed in their
application of Argersinger. Some courts adhered strictly to a narrow

1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. "No State shall .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
5. See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
6. The "special circumstances" class of exceptions, originally labeled such in
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), became the common mode of expanding the right
to counsel. In eleven of thirteen cases decided between Bute and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court found that special circumstances existed, and
thus the appointment of counsel was necessary. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 747 (1964).
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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"actual imprisonment," or "imprisonment in fact" standard. 9 Others
interpreted Argersinger to require counsel whenever there was a
possibility of imprisonment, and so applied the "imprisonment in
law" standard.'" Still others, while recognizing that Argersinger went
no further than the "actual imprisonment" standard, held that the
broader "imprisonment in law" standard was a logical extension of
Argersinger." I
This dispute was resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of
Scott v. Illinois."
FACTS

Aubrey Scott, an indigent, was accused of shoplifting $13.68 worth
of merchandise from an F.W. Woolworth store.' 3 The offense was
punishable by imprisonment up to one year or a fine up to five hundred dollars, or both."' Scott was neither offered nor provided
counsel. At a bench trial, Scott was found guilty and fined fifty
dollars. Scott appealed, claiming that he had been deprived of due process of law because he was not given the benefit of counsel at trial.
Both the appellate court' 5 and the Illinois Supreme Court' 6 affirmed,
finding that Argersihger's counsel requirement did not extend to cases
where there has been no actual imprisonment. The courts saw no
reason to go beyond the bounds of Argersinger merely because imprisonment was one of the sentencing alternatives authorized by the
legislature.' 7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the dispute among jurisdictions.' 8
DECISION

In a 5-4 decision,'

9

the Court affirmed, holding that "the Sixth and

9. See Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1972); Barr v. United States,
415 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Rollins v. State, 299 So. 2d 586 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
10. See Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1978); Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F.
Supp. 651 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
11. See Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1976); Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis.2d
547, 249 N.W.2d 791 (1977).
12. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
13. See People v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 304, 305, 343 N.E.2d 517, 518 (1976),
aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 269, 369 N.E.2d 881 (1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
14. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(e) (Smith-Hurd 1977).
15. 36 Ill. App. 3d 304, 343 N.E.2d 517 (1976), aff'd, 68 Il. 2d 269, 369 N.E.2d
881 (1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
16. 68 Ill. 2d 269, 369 N.E.2d 881 (1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
17. 68 Ill. 2d at 272, 369 N.E.2d at 882.
18. 440 U.S. at 368. See cases cited in notes 9-11 supra.
19. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell joined. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, and Blackmun dissented. This was substantially the same Court which seven
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/9
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Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of
appointed counsel in his defense." 2 0 The Court refused to extend the
right further because it found that the actual imprisonment standard as
laid down in Argersinger was a logical cut off point. The Court maintained that incarceration is "so severe a sanction that it should not be
imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had
been offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense." ' Other sanctions, however, were found to be of a different, less severe nature."
The Scott majority found this distinction to have been "the central
premise of Argersinger,"' ' and adopted it as the foundation for its
own decision."
ANALYSIS
The majority position, while susceptible to criticism, is not without
merit. First, because the basic proposition that imprisonment is inherently different from other penalties is well supported by authority,25
the foundation of the decision is strong. 6 Justice Rehnquist further
strengthened his position by looking at what was actually decided in
Argersinger, and suggesting that the question raised by Scott was implicitly decided in the Argersinger decision. 7 In support of this proposition, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Argersinger Court
made it clear that its decision would affect only those cases which end
up in actual imprisonment, and not "the run of misdemeanors." 28 The
majority in Scott also suggested that because the "imprisonment in
law" standard was brought before the Argersinger Court, but not
adopted, Argersinger, by negative implication, showed a preference
for the "actual imprisonment" standard.2 9 Thus, the Scott majority
established its decision as consistent with Argersinger.
years earlier rendered the decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The
only change in the Court's composition was the replacement of Justice Douglas, who
wrote for the majority in Argersinger, with Justice Stevens, who dissented in Scott.
20.

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id.
See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) ("imprisonment and fines
are intrinsically different"). See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 263 (1970).
Contra, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 48 n.lI (Powell, J., concurring).
26. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
27.

440 U.S. at 369-70, 373.

28. Id. at 370 (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 40).
29. 440 U.S. at 373 n.4.
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Justice Rehnquist also pointed out that, although on its face the
sixth amendment applies to "all criminal prosecutions," 3 it is not as
broad as it may appear." First, it is improbable that the sixth amendment was intended to comprehend the provision of counsel at the
government's expense.3 2 Second, the sixth amendment originally had
no application to state criminal proceedings. 3 This is significant in
that state criminal laws cover a broader spectrum of activities, especially in the petty offense and misdemeanor categories.3" Because of this
distinction, any strict analogy drawn between the state and federal proceedings involves an inherent flaw. Because the federal government
does not regulate, and was not structured to regulate such crimes as
shoplifting, the words "all criminal prosecutions" cannot be construed
to reflect an intent by the framers to protect individuals accused of this
or other petty state crimes.3 5 If the words of the sixth amendment were
interpreted to be so inclusive, it could create great burdens on the
states due to the voluminous number of lesser offenses which are tried
every year. 36 Because of the relatively low volume of such cases in
federal courts, the national government does not bear a similar
burden.
At the same time, because the penalties for these offenses are
significantly lower, there is less benefit to be derived from providing
counsel. Indeed, the cost of providing counsel would often exceed any
fine upon a finding of guilt. 7 Thus, the cost of providing counsel in
such cases may exceed the benefit. 3" This may be best evidenced by the
fact that most nonindigents do not employ counsel in such cases.39 To
appoint counsel for an indigent when most nonindigents would not
hire counsel would be affording the indigent a luxury rather than just
protecting his right to due process. '
30.
31.
32.

440 U.S. at 370.

34.

440 U.S. at 372.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

Id. (citing W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
(1955)).
33. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461 (1942).

IN AMERICAN COURTS

27-30

35. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 473.
36. There are between 1,250,000 and 2,710,820 indigent non-traffic misdemeanor
offenders arrested annually. See Brief of Respondent at 28, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979) (citing NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, L. BENNER &
B. LYNCH-NEARY, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
DEFENDER SURVEY 72 (1973); Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger
and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601 (1975)).
37. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 49 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/9
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Justice Rehnquist in part relied on a similar economic argument as
a justification for his holding in Scott, finding that a requirement for
appointment of counsel in every case where imprisonment is a
possibility would be an "unpredictable, but necessarily substantial"
burden on the state.," Although some states have implemented the
"imprisonment in law" standard with little difficulty," other states
could be greatly burdened if this standard were mandated.4 3 Indeed,
some states have even had difficulties implementing the requirements
of Argersinger." There is evidence that to require the broader "imprisonment in law" standard, as urged by petitioner Scott, would
create insurmountable problems in some jurisdictions."
In response to this economic argument, Justice Brennan, in his
dissenting opinion,, contended that this argument is irrelevant because
it in effect prices indigents out of having representation at trial. 7 Prior
equal protection decisions, such as Griffin v. Illinois" and Mayer v.
City of Chicago,"' represent a "flat prohibition" against pricing indigents out of an effective appeal, even when imprisonment is not imposed at trial.50 Justice Brennan suggested that this prohibition is equally applicable to other "constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants."' Indeed, even the Scott majority recognized that Argersinger
upheld the right to counsel whenever incarceration results, "regardless
of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule." 52
If Justice Rehnquist did in fact deny Scott the right to counsel
because of the burden on the state, his approach is contrary to past
decisions such as Griffin.5 3 But, even though the majority expressed
concern about the burden on the state, its decision primarily rested on
the premise that penalties other than imprisonment are of a different,
41. 440 U.S. at 373.
42. See McInturf v. Horton, 85 Wash. 2d 704, 538 P.2d 499 (1975); Winnie v.
Harris, 75 Wis. 2d 547, 249 N.W.2d 791 (1977). See also S. KRANTz, C. SMITH, D.
ROSSMAN, P. FROYD, & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL INCRIMINAL CASES 71 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as KRANTZ].
43. See Brief of Respondent at 26-27, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
44. Id.
45. See Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L.
REV. 1249 (1970).
46. 440 U.S. at 375.
47. Id. at 384.
48. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
49. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
50. 440 U.S. at 384 (quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1971)).
51. 440 U.S. at 384.
52. Id. at 373.
53. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
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less severe kind." Because of this, the Court found that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require appointment
of counsel where imprisonment is not the sanction imposed." This involved an implicit finding by the Court that Scott's right to counsel
6
under the circumstances was not fundamental. This is the essential
difference between the majority and the minority, in that Justice Bren7
nan viewed Scott's right to counsel as fundamental. Because the issue
8 either view as to the fundamental
has never specifically been decided,
character of Scott's right to counsel is tenable. Because the majority
took the view that the right to counsel was not fundamental, the
economic interest of the state was a relevant concern."
If the burden to the state is considered, as was done by the majority, the high cost to the state may serve as a justification for refusing to
further extend the right to counsel. But this argument is somewhat
weakened by the existence of an alternative which could allow the
states to cope with the burden. As suggested by Justice Brennan, the
6
states might minimize the impact by decriminalizing certain offenses.
The Court in Argersinger indicated that this type of action is par6
ticularly within the domain of the state legislatures. " But because this
represents an alternative approach which would both minimize the
burden to the state and permit counsel to be provided for substantially
all criminal defendants, it is an appropriate consideration in such an
economic analysis.6
54. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
55. Id.
56. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), which established that the
fourteenth amendment incorporates the rights in the bill of rights which are deemed
fundamental. (Palko was overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), but
only with respect to the status of the fifth amendment protection against double
jeopardy as a fundamental right).
57. Justice Brennan viewed precedents more broadly than did Justice Rehnquist,
finding that the reasoning of Gideon extended to "all criminal prosecutions." 440 U.S.
at 378. In Justice Brennan's opinion, precedents answered the question raised in Scott,
and dictated that the petitioner was entitled to appointed counsel. Id.at 378-80. Not
only did he see Scott's right to counsel as fundamental, he viewed it as "perhaps the
most fundamental Sixth Amendment right." Id. at 389.
58. The Argersinger Court specifically declined to resolve the question. 407 U.S.
25, 37.
59. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (the Court considered the
economic burden in finding that there is no perse right to counsel in probation revocation hearings).
60. 440 U.S. at 388.
61. 407 U.S. at 38.
62. See generally KRANTZ, supra note 42, at 141-45. This alternative could be
viewed as analogous to the "lesser restrictive alternatives" test which the Court has
employed of other areas. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 470 (1970) (fundamental first amendment rights cannot be stifled if the government may achieve its ends in a
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/9

19801

NOTES

The Scott decision can also be questioned on a number of other
bases. One concern, which was also expressed by Justice Brennan in
his dissent, is that through this decision the Court has restricted the
right to counsel to a greater degree than the right to trial by jury. 63
Under. Baldwin v. New York 64 a defendant enjoys the right to a jury
trial whenever there is a potential imprisonment of six months or
more. Under the Scott decision, even if there is a potential imprisonment of over six months, there is no right to counsel unless imprisonment is actually imposed. Thus the restriction on the right to counsel
may, in some instances, be greater than the restriction on the right to a
jury trial.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to counsel is at
least as important as other sixth amendment rights.6" The Argersinger
Court refused to limit the right to counsel to the same degree as the
right to a jury trial because: (a) there is no historical support for such
limitation; and (b) the right to counsel "is often requisite to the very
existence of a fair trial. ' ' 66 Indeed, even Justice Powell, while expressing concern about Argersinger'se7 far-reaching implications, recognized that "wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be
drawn so that an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases
where there is a due process right to a jury trial." ' 68 Thus, to limit the
right to counsel to a greater extent than the right to a jury trial, as
Scott does, is inconsistent with the view, expressed in Argersingerand
other cases, that the right to counsel is at least entitled to the same
degree of protection.
The "actual imprisonment" standard utilized in Scott is also inconsistent with other decisions which indicate that the authorized
penalty is the correct measure of the seriousness of the offense for constitutional purposes. In fact, in Duncan v. Louisiana,6 the Court
specifically rejected the use of the "actual imprisonment" standard as
the relevant criterion for determining the seriousness of the offense."0
less restrictive manner); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (interstate commerce cannot be discriminated against when there are lesser restrictive
means available).
63. See 440 U.S. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
65. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978).
66. 407 U.S. at 30-31.
67. 407 U.S. at 44 (Powell, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 45-46. Justice Powell joined the majority opinion in Scott. His concurrence in Argersingerwas joined in by Justice Rehnquist.
69. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
70. Id. at 159-62. The Court saw the penalty authorized "as a guage of ... social
and ethical judgments" of the seriousness of the crime. Id. at 160 (quoting District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937)). The Duncan Court rejected any
Published by eCommons, 1980
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The Court has also employed the authorized penalty as the correct
measure of the seriousness of the offense in regard to a juvenile's right
to counsel.7" There is no apparent reason why the authorized penalty
7 2
in Scott.
should be the correct measure in these instances but not

Another valid criticism of Scott is that it authorizes courts to
abrogate the intent of state legislatures. 7 3 It is, of course, a judge's
place to determine which of the authorized penalties is to be imposed.
Most state statutes provide that the decision be made after trial and
not before. 4 But if counsel is to be provided for an indigent, it must
be before trial and, under Scott, the decision whether to provide
counsel will be preceded by a determination of the likelihood that a
penalty of incarceration will finally be imposed. By considering before
trial what penalties might finally be imposed, the court is contravening
the language of such statutes. Furthermore, if the judge fails to provide counsel at that point he is, contrary to legislative intent,
eliminating a sentencing alternative which the legislature chose to leave
open to him until after all the facts are in.7 5 By deciding what penalty
an offender may receive before he is ever brought to trial, the judge is
embarking on a traditional legislative function.
Not only does this predetermination possibly infringe on a
legislative function, it may also be a source of inaccurate predictions
and judicial bias. That there will be at least some inaccuracies inherent
in individual predictions is obvious. If it were not so, and judges were
consistently capable of making such predictions with accuracy, then
7
the trial itself would be little more than a procedural formality.

6

It is

contrary to basic concepts of justice to suggest that a judge can accurately decide whether the defendant is likely to be found guilty and
what the sentence will be, 7 without benefit of a trial.
Judicial bias is an equally valid concern. As inaccurate as the
judge's prediction may tend to be, it would be little more than
analogy to Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), where the actual punishment
was used to guage the seriousness of the offense. Cheff was found to be distinguishable
because the statute involved, a contempt statute, was silent as to possible punishments.
In Duncan, as in Scott, the statute did prescribe penalties. Duncan viewed such a provision as a "legislative judgment as to the seriousness of the crime ... in the form of
an express authorization to impose a heavy penalty." 391 U.S. at 162 n.35.
71. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
72. See also United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922) (requirements of indictment by a grand jury).
73. See 440 U.S. at 383-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Such a provision exists in Illinois, where Scott was convicted. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
75. 440 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. KRANTZ, supra note 42, at 70.
77. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/9
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guesswork without allowing that judge access to the defendant's past
record and other information which might be inadmissible at trial. But
to allow a judge to consider these factors before trial would be to invite judicial bias. Although the judge is presumed not to consider such
information, he is, after all, human and capable of being influenced.",
Thus, the better practice is thought to be to withhold such information
from the judge to avoid prejudice. 7 9 The Scott decision is contrary to
this view, in that it requires that the judge look at inadmissible information, in order to make a reasonably accurate prediction.
The Scott decision also may be criticized as representing "an
abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents." 80 While Scott
is at least consistent with the letter of Argersinger, the Scott decision
does break with the trend over the last half-century of recognizing the
right to counsel as a fundamental right.
Although the Powell-Gideon-Argersinger line of cases did not
answer the specific question raised in Scott, some broad language in
these decisions suggest that the right to counsel is entitled to great protection. This is particularly true in Gideon, where the Court recognized that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to have a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him." '8 2 Not only does Gideon contain such broad language, it is also
significant that the Gideon Court never expressly limited its holding to
felony prosecutions. Gideon states unconditionally that the right to
counsel is of a fundamental nature, and thus obligatory on the states
through the fourteenth amendment."
Because the Scott decision is contrary to such broad language, the
decision appears contrary to its precedents. If these precedents do not
mandate the wholesale incorporation of the right to counsel,8" they at
78. Id. at 87-90. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (to avoid
judicial vindictiveness, a judge must affirmatively show his reasons for imposing a
more severe sentence after a retrial).
79. Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489 (1969). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)
(recognizing potential prejudice by not allowing the judge to see the presentence report
before a plea or a finding of guilt).
80. 440 U.S. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
81. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-40 (1972); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-70 (1932). See also notes 82-83 infra.
82. 372 U.S. at 344.
83. Id. at 342-44.
84. There was some disagreement between the concurring judges in Gideon as to
whether its decision operated as a total incorporation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Justice Douglas in his concurrence indicated that the incorporation is total.
Id at 346-47. But Justice Harlan, also concurring, maintained that the incorporation is less than total. Id. at 352. The Scott decision apparently establishes that
Justice Harlan's view is correct.
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least reflect a spirit which indicates that the right is an important one
and should not be too readily restricted.
Perhaps, from a practical point of view, a line must be drawn
somewhere.85 But it is questionable whether the Scott Court, in drawing that line, restricted the right to counsel to a greater degree than its
precedents would seem to warrant.
In addition to being susceptible to criticism as being contrary to
past decisions, Scott can also be criticized for opening the door to
future difficulties. The first of these difficulties is one of enforcement.
This problem may arise when a judge predetermines that an indigent is
not going to be imprisoned, and is therefore not entitled to appointed
counsel. After trial, and a finding of guilt, a fine is imposed. If the indigent for some reason fails to pay the fine, which is not altogether
unlikely in view of his indigency, the court has limited means of compelling him to pay. A conventional remedy would be to bring a contempt proceeding against him. But, even if counsel is provided in this
contempt proceeding, it is at least doubtful, under Argersinger, that
8 6
the court could imprison the indigent. The imprisonment, as a practical matter, would still be a result of the first proceeding. Furthermore, if imprisonment were allowed at this point, Argersinger would
have little meaning for those judges wishing to circumvent its requirements. A judge could refuse to appoint an attorney, impose the
maximum fine on a penniless indigent, and then imprison him for
contempt upon failure to pay. Such circumvention is unlikely to be
countenanced. 87 As a result, once the fine is imposed, the trial court
8
will have few, if any, tools of enforcement.
Another concern which may spark reconsideration of the Scott
89
decision is the prohibition against double jeopardy. This may come
into play when the judge's pretrial prediction of the likelihood of incarceration proves inaccurate.8 If the judge does not appoint counsel
initially, the Argersinger requirements will not be met by appointing
85. See 440 U.S. at 372.
86. See KRANTZ, supra note 42, at 38-43.
87. Id. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 55 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
88. This is but one of the situations where indirect imprisonment can result. A
similar problem may arise where a repeat offender is involved, or where an offender is
put on probation or given a suspended sentence conditioned on good behavior. See
generally KRANTZ, supra note 42, at 33-44; Note, Argersingerv. Hamlin and the Collateral Use of PriorMisdemeanor Convictions of Indigents Unrepresentedby Counsel
at Trial, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 168 (1974).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision was held applicable to the states in
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
90. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/9
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counsel later in the trial.9" To declare a mistrial and hold a new trial
solely to allow a harsher sentence would arguably be a violation of the
guarantee against double jeopardy.9 " Although the Court has stated
that a mistrial does not necessarily violate the double jeopardy clause
in all instances, 9 3 it has held that granting a mistrial for the sole purpose of giving a prosecutor a better chance at a conviction does run
afoul of the clause. 94 A situation where the sole purpose of the new
trial is to increase the penalty is analogous.
Scott may also be challenged on the basis of the equal protection
guarantee. 9 One problem here is whether the indigent is deprived of
equal protection because he is denied the benefit of counsel available
to a nonindigent. Because misdemeanants have a five times better
chance of being acquitted if they are respresented by counsel, this
claim should not be casually dismissed as artificial. 9 The indigent
would receive a different kind of trial solely because he could not afford to have counsel appointed. The Court has recognized that
"[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has." 97 Because Scott authorizes
such disparate treatment, it runs contrary to past equal protection
decisions.9 8 But, because the Scott Court explicitly rejected a due process contention similar to this argument, it is doubtful that the Court
will overrule its decision on the basis of this equal protection claim. 99
A totally different equal protection claim may be raised by the
nonindigent accused of the same offense as an indigent. If the judge
predetermines that the indigent is not entitled to counsel, he cannot be
imprisoned. But under the same circumstances the nonindigent may be
91. KRANTZ, supra note 42, at 74.
92. Justice Powell recognized this problem in his concurring opinion in Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25, 54 (citing Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) and North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)).
93. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
94. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
95. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. See 407 U.S. 25, 36.
97. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (where the Court held that to deny
an indigent an appeal solely because he could not afford to pay for the court transcript
was a denial of equal protection).
98. Id.
99. The Scott Court seemed to indicate that Scott's right to counsel in this instance was not fundamental. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court indicated that wealth is not in itself a suspect class. Therefore, the Court is unlikely to
find an equal protection challenge such as this one an occasion to invoke strict
scrutiny.

Published by eCommons, 1980

188

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

imprisoned,' 0 and, if in fact he is imprisoned, he would appear to
0
have a valid equal protection claim." ' To allow the penalty to vary
solely on the basis of wealth, as here, has been held to be a violation of
0
the equal protection guarantee.'1 This anomaly could be corrected by
requiring a predetermination of the likelihood of incarceration for
both indigents and nonindigents. When the relative costs are weighed,
it would appear preferable to spend the money employing counsel for
all indigents.' 03
IMPLICATIONS

Scott is significant in that it sets the outer limits of the constitutional right of an indigent to have counsel provided for him. Indigents
in state court trials will not be entitled to appointed counsel under the
Constitution, unless that trial ends up in the actual deprivation of
liberty. I04
Although the Supreme Court has never specifically recognized a
broader interpretation of the right to counsel, many subordinate courts
have employed a broader standard, viewing it as a constitutional requirement.'0 5 Scott establishes that this broader interpretation is incorrect, and in this sense effectively overrules these decisions. These
employ the broader standard as a requirement of
courts may no longer
06
the Constitution.'
Because of the availability of independent grounds on which the
right to counsel may be extended, however, the implications of Scott
may not sweep so wide as may initially appear. First, a judge will still
be free to implicitly use the broader "imprisonment in law" standard
by automatically appointing counsel any time imprisonment is a
possibility. It is certainly within the judge's discretion to keep the option of imprisonment open until all the evidence is in. Second, state
100. See KRANTZ, supra note 42, at 84-85. The authors also suggests that an equal
protection claim arises merely because the nonindigent is not given the benefit of
knowing before trial that he cannot be imprisoned.
101. Id.
102. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). To illustrate, suppose A (an indigent) and B (a nonindigent) are caught smoking marijuana, a misdemeanor in some
jurisdictions. The judge predetermines that A, who has a clean record, need not have
an attorney appointed in his behalf. B is tried and imprisoned. At A's trial it is proven
that he was actually the instigator. Although his culpability is greater, he cannot be imprisoned because of his indigency. This runs contrary to Williams. It should make no
difference that the discrimination is of an inverse nature. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
103. See KRANTZ, supra note 42, at 84.
104. 440 U.S. at 373-74.
105. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
106. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
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NOTES

legislatures are free to require by law that counsel be provided
whenever imprisonment is a possibility, or even in all criminal prosecutions. State constitutions can also be amended or interpreted to provide for a broader right to counsel. Some states have already taken
these routes. 0'° Others are free to follow, although Scott is authority
that this broader approach is not mandated by due process.
In practice, Scott may do little or nothing to change the right to
counsel as it existed under Argersinger. Those states which desire an
expanded right to counsel can readily find some avenue to reach this
goal, although they may not rely on the United States Constitution.
Those states which wish to restrict counsel will still be bound by the
minimum requirement of Argersinger. The real effect of Scott is that it
does not require more of these states, and thus legitimizes any restrictions which do not violate Argersinger.'°8
CONCLUSION

Scott v. Illinois will undoubtedly prove to be a controversial decision. Although it can be defended as a necessary restriction of the right
to counsel, it also can be criticized on many bases. Because it is controversial, it is likely that many states will take other avenues to expand
the right to counsel. For those that do not, it is likely that their decisions and the rationale of Scott will be vigorously challenged both in
and out of court. These challenges will sooner or later find their way
into the Supreme Court. But, until then, Scott represents the outer
limits to the sixth amendment right to counsel, as applied to indigents
in state courts.
Stephen A. Watring
107. See 440 U.S. at 386-87 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. It should be noted that Scott will have no application in federal prosecutions.
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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